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Speed limits were introduced in the Lagoon of Venice in 2002 to reduce wave motion, 
which damages environmentally sensitive areas in the broader Lagoon as well as 
buildings in the city of Venice. In this paper, we estimate the welfare losses experienced 
by recreational boaters as a result of the speed limits. We fit a single-site travel cost 
model to a sample of boaters intercepted as they depart from or arrive to marinas and 
launching ramps on the Lagoon. Our Poisson model is corrected for truncation and 
endogenous stratification. We construct three measures of the price per trip, which 
allow us to check the sensitivity of models and welfare estimates to possible 
measurement errors in the opportunity cost of time. Our results are robust to the 
measure of price used and conservatively peg the welfare losses of boaters to €7.7-9.6 
million per year. Even under conservative assumptions, the welfare losses of boaters are 
sufficiently large that, given current monitoring and enforcement of the speed limits, we 
believe there is a strong incentive for boaters to disregard the limits. 
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I. Introduction and Motivation 
Speed limits are sometimes imposed on navigational channels and waterways for 
safety reasons, and to protect wildlife, natural resources and structures (Parnell and Kofoed-
Hansen, 2001). Thomas and Stratis (2002) report that in 1989 the state of Florida imposed 
speed limits to avoid disrupting the natural habitat of the Florida manatee, an endangered 
species. Speed limits were imposed in 2002 in the Lagoon of Venice
1, a body of water on 
UNESCO’s cultural heritage site list, and a unique hydrological and ecological system, to 
reduce wave motion, which is responsible for damage to historical buildings in the city of 
Venice, coastal erosion, and adverse effects on the Lagoon ecosystem.  
At this time, these restrictions are effective in the navigable waters within the 
jurisdiction of the City of Venice, including to shallow water areas (e.g., Burano, Cavallino 
Treporti, Valli di Chioggia, Sant’Erasmo), many of which are highly prized for their 
ecological and environmental quality, but are also heavily used by boaters and tourists. The 
ordinances impose speed limits on motorboats exceeding 2.3 meters in length and prohibit 
access in specified areas, providing exceptions for “traditional” boats, which are slower and 
contribute less to wave motion. Natural resource managers are currently evaluating whether 
these restrictions should be extended to neighboring jurisdictions and other parts of the 
Lagoon as well. 
                                                 
1 Municipality of Venice, Ordinanza n. 09/2002 of the 2 February 2002; Ordinanza 31/2002 of the 27 September 




When speed limit regulations are proposed, economists would recommend that natural 
resource managers weigh the gains from the regulations against the costs imposed on the 
users of the natural resource system. Do the speed limit regulations pass the cost-benefit test? 
In the North and South Lagoon, for example, speed limits should help reduce the damage of 
wave motion to environmentally sensitive areas, like barene (shoals), may reduce impacts on 
buildings in Venice proper, and are unlikely to impact in any way commercial aquaculture.  
Recreational boaters, however, may stand to lose from speed limits because they limit their 
enjoyment of the regulated body of water and/or raise the cost of using it.  
These costs and benefits have not been quantified before, and, to our knowledge, few 
studies have examined systematically the gains and losses on the regulated entities and 
communities of imposing speed limits in other bodies of water. Thomas and Stratis (2002) 
treat the imposition of speed limits as effectively eliminating routes. They fit a model of 
choice among alternative navigation routes, and estimate the welfare loss associated with the 
elimination of routes rendered useless by the speed limit. Salomon et al. (2004) use the cost of 
speed limit law enforcement as a proxy for foregone development benefits in their benefit-
cost analysis of a proposed safe minimum standard for the Florida manatee. The benefits of 
the policy include revenue from manatee-related ecotourism, ecological services provided by 
manatees, and the public’s willingness to pay for conservation, which they elicit through a 
contingent valuation survey.  
In this paper, we wish to estimate the losses experienced by recreational boat users in 
the Lagoon of Venice as a consequence of the speed limit, but choose a somewhat different 
approach. Specifically, we estimate a single-site model predicting the number of boating trips 




losses of the speed limit are valued by treating the speed limit as an increase in the price per 
trip. This is due to an increase in fuel consumption per unit of distance traveled, and by the 
opportunity cost of the additional travel time.  
Our data come from a survey of recreational boaters intercepted at a total of 16 
privately owned marinas and boat launching ramps on the Lagoon of Venice in May-August 
2002. We queried these boaters about the trips of the year 2001—before the new speed limit 
regulations were implemented. We focus on recreational boaters because this is a category of 
Lagoon users whose trips are discretionary and likely to be sensitive to policies that alter the 
cost of a trip.
2  We focus on private marinas and ramps for three reasons. First, there are a 
total of 35 privately owned and operated marinas on the Lagoon waterfront, for a total of 5500 
mooring spaces, 40% of which are on water. On average, each mooring space generates 
revenue for about €1200 a year, for a total of over €6 million euro a year. In addition to 
paying fees to the marinas, individual boaters are estimated to spend about €500-600 a year 
each directly for their boating trips. They also invest considerable amounts of money on 
maintenance and repairs. This is, therefore, an important industry that serves an important 
category of recreational users of the Lagoon of Venice.  
Second, most of the privately owned marinas and ramps appear to be located near 
barene, the delicate natural environment and ecological systems at high risk of erosion due to 
the wave motion created by boats. For this reason, the speed limits in the Lagoon are 
particularly stringent in the vicinity of these marinas and boat launching points,
3 implying that 
boat owners who keep their vessels there are likely to bear the full brunt of the speed limits.  
                                                 
2 In addition, the wave motion created by these users is likely to affect primarily the highly prized barene in the 
North Lagoon, with some effects trickling down to the buildings of the Venice city center. 
3 The speed limits vary across the areas of the Lagoon, ranging from 5 kmh in the narrow canals closest to the 




Third, the speed limit regulations may have a large impact on the future development 
of private marinas. Many observers believe that the demand for mooring spaces will remain 
strong in the future, if all conditions remain the same. Virtually all of this demand will be met 
by private marinas. Marinas are currently virtually 100% occupied, and there are long waiting 
lists for mooring spaces at virtually all of them. Several plans have been drafted for building 
more, which conflict with the regulations seeking to reduce wave motion in the Lagoon by 
limiting boat traffic. These conflicts suggests that natural resource managers may wish to 
weigh boat traffic restrictions with the losses in welfare for recreationists (and for the marina 
industry) when making decisions about Lagoon use.  
Because the survey was conducted before the new speed limits went into effect, we 
first fit a trip demand function using the current price of a trip. Next, we calculate what the 
price per trip would have been in the presence of the speed limits (it would have been higher), 
and calculate the corresponding welfare change. Clearly, our calculations presume that 
individual tastes were not altered by the policy, so that the demand function for trips remains 
the same.  Our results are robust to the measure of price used and conservatively peg the 
welfare losses of boaters to €7.7-9.6 million per year. Even under conservative assumptions, 
the welfare losses of boaters are sufficiently large that, given current monitoring and 
enforcement of the speed limits, we believe there is a strong incentive for boaters to disregard 
the limits.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the survey 
design and administration and the data. Section III describes the Travel Cost Method, derives 
a model of Lagoon boating trips, and develops the econometric model. Section IV presents 





II. The Survey and the Data 
A. Characteristics of the Respondents  
We developed a questionnaire eliciting information about boat ownership, use and 
trips into the Lagoon of Venice, and administered it on site at 16 private marina and ramp 
locations chosen to be representative of the universe of facilities and launching points on the 
Lagoon.  
The first part of the questionnaire queries respondents about their boating trips into the 
Lagoon, including the total number of trips in the previous year, sites visited, travel time, etc.  
The second part of the questionnaire investigates the respondents’ boat ownership, boat 
characteristics (e.g., type, length, and engine power) and the annual costs of keeping the boat 
at a private marina. The third part of the questionnaire elicits individual expenditures on trips 
into the Lagoon, followed by questions about the respondents’ demographics and individual 
characteristics, such as age, income, education, etc. 
We contacted about 300 persons, for a total of 263 completed interviews. The 
response rate is thus 87.7%. As shown in table 1, the typical respondents is a male (72% of 
the sample) and full-time employed (80% of the sample). Professionals/clerical workers and 
self-employed persons account for 33.3% and 31.9% of the sample, respectively, and retired 
persons account for about 10 percent. The average age is 45 years. About 48.8% percent of 
the sample has completed high school, and 11% has a college degree. The average family size 






Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the respondents. 
Variable Observations  Mean  Standard  deviation 
Male (dummy)  263  0.7186  0.4497 
Age (years)   263  45.58  10.55 
Full-time employed (dummy)  263  0.7947  0.4039 
Retired (dummy)  263   0.1027  0.3040 
High-school diploma (dummy)  263  0.4880  0.4998 
College degree (dummy)  263  0.1103  0.0980 
Household size  263  3.09  0.93 
Household income (euro per 
year) 
263 33,654  18,036 
Environmental 
organization/volunteer 
263 0.076 0.01 
 
 
B. Ownership and Type of Boat 
The majority of the respondents (88.2%) use their own boats. Regarding boat type, 
over three-quarters of the sample (76.4%) use a fiberglass boat and 10.4% uses a rubber 
dinghy. Traditional wood boats account for only 3% of the sample. The boats used by our 
respondents are generally small (the average length is 6.5 meters, and the median length is 5.5 
meters), relatively new (the average age is 8.5 years) and powered by good engines (about 86 
HP), almost half of which are two-stroke engines (47.9%).  
The power of the engine—which, combined with width and length, determines the 
wave motion created by the boat—varies with the type of boat. Traditional wood boats, for 
example, average about 48 HP,
4 rubber dinghies 59, and fiberglass boats 94.  
About 70% of our respondents keep their boats at private marinas, as might be 
expected, since we surveyed persons as they departed from or returned to private marinas or 
                                                 
4 We calculate this average after excluding one obvious outlier from the subsample of wood boats. Had this 




ramps.  Respondents spend on average €1200 a year to keep their boats in private marinas and 
about €400 a year for maintenance, repairs, and insurance. 
 
C. Boating Trips 
The number of annual Lagoon trips ranges from 1 to 70, the average is 9.6, and the 
standard deviation is 10.00. About three-quarters of the sample report taking ten or less trips 
per year, and 55% report taking 6 or less, suggesting that we should use a count data model 
for these data. There were a total of 202 valid observations for this variable.  
We calculated three alternative measures of the cost of a trip into the Lagoon. The first 
is the out-of-pocket cost of the trip, which adds together the cost of travelling from home to 
the marina, fuel for the boat, food, etc. The second and third are estimates of the full cost of a 
trip, and are equal to the out-of-pocket cost plus the opportunity cost of the time spent on the 
trip.  These were based on the assumption that the wage rate is equal to individual annual 
income divided by 2000 hours. In one variant of the full cost of the trip, the opportunity cost 
of time is equal to total trip time multiplied by the wage rate. In the other variant, we 
performed the same calculation but—following much of the travel cost literature since 
Cesario (1976)—we assumed the opportunity cost of time to be equal to one-third of the wage 
rate. Since the goal of our study is to estimate the welfare loss (if any) associated to speed 
limit regulations, we also calculated the cost and time per trip in the presence of the speed 
limits.  
We were able to calculate these six measures of price per trip (three variants with and 
without speed limits) for a total of 195 respondents. As shown in table 2, for these persons the 




absence and presence of the speed limits, respectively. When we factor in the opportunity cost 
of time, the average cost of the trip ranges from €48 to €160. The speed limits raise fuel costs, 
since these boats are extremely fuel-inefficient at low speeds, as well as travel time.
5 It is not, 
therefore, surprising that the average cost per trip increases significantly with the imposition 
of the new speed limits. 
 
Table 2 – Average costs per trip in € (standard deviation in parentheses). 
 Out-of-pocket 
cost per trip 
Full cost per trip I 
(wage rate)  
Full cost per trip II 
(1/3 of the wage rate)  



















III. The Travel Cost Model 
  We use the number of Lagoon boating trips in a year to fit a single-site travel cost 
model. The model allows us to estimate the surplus associated with visits at the current 
conditions and the change in surplus due to the speed limits.     
 
A. The Single-site Travel Cost Model  
  In a single-site travel cost method (TCM) model, it is assumed that an individual’s 
utility depends on aggregate consumption, X, leisure, L and trips r to the site: 
(1)                                             )) ( , , ( q r L X U U = .  
We further assume weak complementarity of trips with exogenously set quality at the site, q. 
In other words,  0 / = ∂ ∂ q U  when r = 0 (people do not care about the quality of the site if they 
                                                 
5 Since most of these boats have a flat hull and cannot plane at the low speeds imposed by the speed limits, 




do not visit it), and r is increasing in q. The individual chooses X, L and r to maximize utility 
subject to the budget constraint: 
(2)            ( ) [ ] ( ) r d P f X t t r L T w y d ⋅ ⋅ + + = + − − ⋅ + 2 1  
where y is non-work income, w is the wage rate, T  is total time,  1 t  is travel time to the site, 
2 t  is time spent at the site, f is the access fee (if any), Pd is the cost per kilometer, and d is the 
distance to the site. The price of the aggregate good X is normalized to 1.
6  
This yields the demand function for trips: 
(3)                                         () q p w y r r r, , , * * =  
where  () d p f t t w p d r ⋅ + + + = 2 1  is the full price of a trip. 
We specify a log-linear demand function for trips.  We focus on access to the Lagoon 
under the current conditions, and do not attempt to capture the effect on demand of changing 
site quality q. Formally,  
(4)                                        ) exp( * 2 1 0 r p w r β β β + + = .  
Equation (4) becomes an econometric model once (i) r* is interpreted as the expected 
number of trips, and (ii) we introduce r, the observed number of trips, which is a random 
variable with expected value equal to r*. To estimate the coefficients in equation (4), it is 
necessary to ask a sample of visitors and potential visitors to report the number of trips they 
took in a specified period (year or season), their cost per trip pr, plus w, y, and other individual 
characteristics that might affect the demand for visits to the site. Ideally, the price per trip to 
an alternative site should also be included in the model, lest the estimated coefficient on own 
                                                 
6 This model further assumes that travel time and time spent at the site are exogenous, that the opportunity costs 
for time travelling and on-site time are equal to the wage rate, that there is no utility or disutility from travelling 
to the site, and that each trip to the site is undertaken for no other purpose than visiting the site. It also assumes 
that individuals perceive and respond to changes in travel costs in the same way they would to changes in a fee 




price per trip be biased, the severity of the bias depending on the correlation between the two 
price variables. 
Once the demand function has been estimated, the consumer surplus provides an 
approximation of the welfare associated with visiting the site.
7 Formally, based on equation 
(4), the consumer surplus is equal to: 




) , ( r q p CS
β
− = ,  
where ) exp( 0 2 1 0 p w r o β β β + + =  and  0 p  is current price. The consumer surplus 
corresponding to this functional form for the recreational trip demand is the shaded area in 
Figure 1. 
 




                                                 
7 Haab and McConnell (2003) argue that since income effects tend to be small, the consumer surplus is a good 








r r − −
β
, where  1 r  is the expected number of trips when the speed limits are in force, 




B. The Econometric Model. 
We use a Poisson equation to describe boating trips into the Lagoon of Venice. This is 
appropriate because individuals do not report numerous trips (the average per year is about 
10), so that a continuous distribution would provide a poor approximation to the observed 
data.  Formally, letting Y denote a count-data variable, the probability function for Y implied 
by a Poisson model is: 








= =  ,  
where λ>0 is the parameter indexing the Poisson distribution. Both the expected value and the 
variance of Y are equal to λ.  
We specify a Poisson model where Y is the annual number of trips and λ is individual- 
specific: 











= = , 
and 
(8)      ) exp( 2 1 β λ i i i p + = β x . 
                                                 
8 The speed limits would shift the trip demand function if the existence of the speed limit affects utility directly, 
in addition through changing the price and hence the optimal number of trips. We assume that it is not so, but are 
unable to test this assumption because we do not have observations from after the passage of the speed limit 




Clearly,  i λ  is our operational equivalent of 
* r . Following equation (4), x is a vector of 
determinants of Lagoon trips, including income, whereas  i p  is the price per trip faced by the 
respondent, and β1 and β2 are unknown coefficients.   
Estimation of the parameters in (8) is further complicated by the nature of our sample. 
Because we intercept people on site, (i) the observations are truncated from below at one, and 
(ii) the people that we are more likely to run into are the most avid visitors, i.e., those persons 
with the highest  i λ s.  Accordingly, if we wish to estimate the parameters in (8) using the 
method of maximum likelihood, the correct probability function is:  





















where Pr(•) is the Poisson distribution function (equation (7)), and the subscript i has been 
omitted to avoid notational clutter (Shaw, 1988).
9 
The likelihood function of the sample is thus∏
i
i y h ) ( , and the log likelihood function 
is  
(10)     ∑
i
i y h ) ( log .  
It is easily shown (see Shaw, 1988) that (9) is simplified to the probability function of a 
Poisson variate defined as  . 1 − = ′ y y  This approach produces population estimates of the 
coefficients, although one only has the sample that was intercepted on-site (Englin and 
Shonkwiler, 1995).  
 
                                                 
9 A similar type of adjustment can be implemented with negative binomial trips. We experimented with 
estimating negative binomial models corrected for on-site sampling, but these models failed to converge. We 




C.  Specification of the Econometric Model 
In our theoretical model, the demand for trips (equation (4)) should depend on the full 
price of a trip, which includes the opportunity cost of time. Following common practice, we 
compute the opportunity cost of time in two ways, using the wage rate and one-third of the 
wage rate (Cesario, 1976), respectively.
10  Azevedo et al. (2003) point out that computing the 
opportunity cost of time in this fashion is likely to introduce measurement error in the price of 
a trip, which in turn results in attenuation bias (Greene, 2003, p. 83-86). Accordingly, we also 
run a specification of the model where we enter the out-of-pocket cost of a trip and income 
separately (as in Alberini et al., 2005, and Hynes et al., 2005).    
Finally, it is important to tackle the issue of substitute sites. Ideally, the price per trip 
to an alternative site should be included in the model, lest the estimated coefficient on own 
price per trip be biased, the severity of the bias depending on the correlation between the two 
price variables. However, it is difficult to identify substitutes to the Lagoon of Venice, so we 
are forced to ignore this variable in our empirical work. 
We also examine how the demand for trips is shifted by individual characteristics. In 
sum, our candidate regressors are price per trip, income, a gender dummy, a dummy 
indicating whether the respondent is a retired person (which captures the availability of time), 
age, a college education dummy, and a dummy for whether the respondent keeps his or her 
boat at a private marina (MARINA), which we regard as a measure of commitment to 
boating.   
                                                 
10 McConnell and Strand (1981) have suggested an approach for estimating this fraction directly from the data 
reported by the respondent in a TCM survey, and, more recently, Shaw and Feather (1999) develop the correct 
imputation of the opportunity cost of time for those persons who work more hours than they wish, fewer hours 
than they would prefer, or are not gainfully employed. Hynes et al. (2005) use data from a general household 
survey to estimate a hedonic wage model in order to predict the market wage rate of students and persons who 





IV. Results  
In what follows, we report results based on the Poisson model with the correction for 
on-site sampling [equation (9), likelihood function (10), and λ specified as an exponential 
function of the regressors, as in equation (8)].  
Table 3 displays the results of three alternative specifications, which differ in the 
measure of cost per trip used. Specification (I) enters the out-of-pocket cost of a trip, 
specification (II) the full cost per trip at the full wage rate, and specification (III) the full cost 
per trip at one-third of the wage rate. Income is entered separately in all three specifications. 
The coefficient on price per trip is negative and significant, as expected, in all 
specifications, regardless of the measure of price used. The three coefficients on price are 
reasonable, and imply price elasticities of trips of -0.04, -0.03, and -0.04, respectively.  In 
turn, these mean that for the average boater in our sample it takes a price increase of about 
60% for expected trips to decline by one. This effect is consistent across the three 
specifications of the model.  
In all three specifications, household income enters in the regression with a negative 
sign, and the coefficient is significant, even in specifications (II) and (III), where income is 
already factored into the price per trip. Males take about 25-26% more trips than female 
respondents, all else the same. By contrast, despite their free time, retired persons take 36-
41% fewer trips than all others, a result that perhaps is due to the fact that they limit boating 
to a shorter period in the summer. In spite of this, age is positively and significantly related to 
the number of trips. We find that the type of boat owned and its engine power-to-length 




her boat at a privately owned marina does not. We also do not find any statistically discernible 
differences in the number of trips between people that do and do not have a college degree.  
 
Table 3. Poisson regressions with truncation and endogenous stratification  
(t-statistics in parentheses).  

















Full price per trip at 1/3 od 
wage rate (Prezzosenza13) 






























































     
Log-likelihood  -1069.15 -1060.04 -1058.46 
Obs.  188 185 185 
 
 
Since our likelihood function adjusts for the nature of the sample, the estimated 
coefficients refer to the population of boaters, and can therefore be used to compute welfare 
statistics for the population. Unfortunately, at this time we do not have information about the 




We therefore compute the welfare measures for each person in our sample using the 
population coefficients, assuming that the individual characteristics (income, age, etc.) of the 
persons in the sample are similar to those of the population of Lagoon boaters.  
At the current prices (in the absence of limits), the average consumer surplus in the 
sample is €2147, €3140, and €2293, based on the results of specification (I), (II) and (III), 
respectively.
11 Each of the model specifications implies that imposing the speed limits would 
reduce the expected number of trips by about two trips,
12 for welfare changes of €905, €1135, 
and €1040 in specifications (I), (II), and (III), respectively. Assuming conservatively that the 
number of Lagoon boaters using private marinas on the mainland side of the Lagoon is about 
8500, the welfare losses due the imposition of the speed limits range from €7.692 to €9.647 
million a year. 
 
V. Discussion and Conclusions 
We have estimated single-site travel cost models of boating trips into the Lagoon of 
Venice to study the possible welfare losses due to the imposition of speed limit, one of the 
policies currently in place to reduce wave motion in the Lagoon.  The latter is responsible for 
damages to environmentally sensitive areas and to buildings.  
Most travel cost method specialists recommend using the full price of a trip, which is 
inclusive of the opportunity cost of time, when fitting such trip demand functions. However 
Azevedo et al. (2003) point out that, due to the difficulty of knowing exactly what the value of 
                                                 
11 A more refined measure of the consumer surplus per year can be calculated by subtracting the fixed costs. We 
estimate the fixed costs to be about €1240 a year. This figure is calculated as follows. Boat owners who keep 
their boats at private marinas pay on average €1200 a year for their berth. Since 70% of our sample keep their 
boats at private marinas, the average over the entire sample is €(1200×0.70)=€840. We add about €400 a year for 
maintenance and insure to obtain €1240.  
12 The exact change in the average predicted number of trips is 2.02 in specification (I), 1.71 in specification (II) 




time is, doing so is likely to introduce measurement errors, which may invalidate the estimate 
of the coefficient on price, and hence the welfare statistics. 
Accordingly, we experimented with three alternative measures of the price per trip—
out-of-pocket costs plus two alternative measures of the full cost—but our estimation results, 
predicted welfare change and predicted number of trips with and without speed limits are 
remarkably similar across these alternative approaches. Our calculations indicate that 
establishing the speed limits almost triples the cost of a boating trip, and our models in turn 
indicate that such increase reduces annul trips by two. The corresponding change in surplus is 
€905-1135 a year, so even conservative estimates of the number of boaters using private 
marinas on the mainland side of the Lagoon (about 8500) result in relatively large losses of 
welfare on the order of €7.692 to 9.647 million per year. These losses must be added with 
losses experienced by other categories (e.g., the marina industry; water taxi and commercial 
boat operators within the city of Venice, etc.), and then compared with the monetized benefits 
of imposing speed limits to conduct a complete cost-benefit analysis of this policy. 
Our welfare loss calculations assume, of course, full compliance to the speed limits on 
the part of the recreational boaters. Facing these welfare losses, and given the current penalty 
structure for violations, should we expect boaters to actually obey these speed limits? We 
reason that a boater will ignore the speed limits on a given trip if the welfare loss due to the 
limits is greater than the expected penalty, which is the product of the fine times the 
probability of being caught and fined. 
The fines for breaking the limits range from €52 to €516, depending on the severity of 
the violation and on the whether the violation occurred in the open Lagoon or near urban 




pay the penalty on the spot. We estimate that the average fine is €100 for violations occurring 
in the open Lagoon, and €155 for violations taking place in inner canals, in the city of Venice 
proper, and near urban centers.  
In the absence of the speed limit, the surplus per trip is €215-314, depending on the 
choice of the price per trip variable. The surplus per trip is €155-236 with the speed limits. 
The loss of welfare on a per trip basis is thus €59-78.  For violations occurring in the open 
Lagoon, where the average fine is about €100, the likelihood of being caught must be 
extremely high—greater than 0.6-0.8—for the boater to choose to comply with the speed 
limits. For violations occurring in inner canals and near urban areas, where the penalty is 
higher (€155), a lower likelihood of being caught (0.4 to 0.5) is sufficient to create the 
incentive to comply with the limits.  
In practice, we believe that the actual likelihood of being caught is much lower than 
these break-even thresholds, especially in the open Lagoon. Given the large welfare loss 
incurred by boaters and the current monitoring levels, the fines are inadequate to ensure that 
boaters will obey the speed limits and limit the damages to environmentally sensitive areas. 
These considerations should play a role in the benefit-cost calculus, and in the design of an 
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